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FEAF INTELLIGENCE ROUNDUP

No. 141 | 12 JULY THROUGH 27 JULY | 1953

SPECIAL ARMISTICE ISSUE



BASKET RADAR MOUNTED ON VAN WORKS WITH 5TH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT MAKING COMBAT STRIKES DEEP IN NORTH KOREA

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FEAF
INTELLIGENCE ROUNDUP

ISSUE No. 141						
THE REPORTING PERIOD						
JULY 1953						
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12	13	14	15	16	17	18
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INTELLIGENCE

ROUNDUP



RECAP OF COMMUNIST AIR STRENGTH NORTH OF THE YALU

THE Chinese Communist, North Korean, and Soviet air units which have been tied down on the base complex of approximately 20 airfields north of the Yalu River throughout the latter part of the Korean hostilities now represent a substantial force of 1,390 aircraft which may eventually be released to serve Communist purposes elsewhere in the Far East.

The North Korean air arm of approximately 300 aircraft may remain in the present base area and indeed may continue to grow in size and proficency under Soviet sponsorship. A few Soviet air units which continuously rotated through the border airfields and the Mukden complex may eventually return to the Port Arthur or Maritime areas. The bulk of air strength in the Yalu area, however, is comprised of the Chinese Communist Air Force.

Until the military armistice assumes a proportion of stability and the political phase of settlement of the Korean problem appears promising, the Sino-Soviet-North Korean forces may continue to occupy their present base complexes in numbers. Though the enemy air forces north of the Yalu will be occupied with a bit of wound-licking, it still represents the most substantial non-Soviet threats in the Far East.

While the limited expediency of creating an air threat in North Korean territory from crated aircraft pre-stored south of the Yalu is a



ENEMY AIRFIELDS

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT activity for the period (aside from the signing of the armistice) was the sighting of 43 MIG-15s on 19 July at Uiju Airfield. Not since 26 November 1951 have any MIGs been reported on any airfield in North Korea. Also on 25 July, photography revealed that six to ten new U-type revetments have been constructed in the east dispersal area on Uiju. They are probably intended for the MIG-15s, as the openings were only 30 to 40 feet in width. At the same time, it was noted that several of the G-type revetments had been modified to U-type with 75-foot openings, easily capable of storing an Il-28.

Sinuiju, as were several other important airfields, was post-holed on 22 July by Bomber Command aircraft, leaving an enormous reconstruction job for the Reds.

Namsi and Taechon were bombed during the period and both are at this time unserviceable.

Photo cover was taken on 31 of the 34 major North Korean airfields on 27 July--the last day of the war. On 28 July, an immediate preliminary-operation report was received--late in the afternoon. However, the report contained information on only 10 of the 31 airfields and full coverage on the status of the balance of the fields at the end of the hostilities will, of necessity, have to be delayed until the next ROUNDUP reporting period.

Of the ten airfields covered in the report, only Uiju was considered operational for aircraft--with 6,000 feet of the taxi-strip serviceable, and the sod landing area adjacent to the concrete runway possibly serviceable. There were 21 MIG-15s destroyed and two possibly destroyed at Uiju by the 22 July BOMCOM bombings.

At Sinuiju Airfield, the bombings possibly destroyed six light-aircraft. The aircraft previously reported on the field had been moved. The runway at Sinuiju was unserviceable.

The following airfields were also reported to be unserviceable at the end of the reporting period: Sinuiju N.E., Pyongyang Main, Pyongyang East, Pyongyang Downtown, Saamcham, Namsi, Taechon and Sinanju.

This will in all probability be the last operational status report published on North Korean Airfields --with the exception of the full report on the balance of the airfields mentioned earlier in this report, on which photo cover was flown prior to the ending of the war. END

WONDERFUL!

PICTURE ON THE PRECEDING page shows how the news that the truce had been signed effected A/2C Wilbur E. Baker--a B-29 gunner with the 98th Bomb Wing. Picture above shows crew members of an RB-29 of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron who flew the last photo recon mission of the war--which also was the last B-29 mission of the war. Below, A/1C Carl K. Rose, member of the 6161st Supply squadron reads truce news--atop a pile of 500-pound bombs.



(RESTRICTED)

MAJOR NO.	NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELDS	COORDINATE
1.	HOEMUN	EA 5486
2.	KANGGYE	BA 9831
3.	ULJU	XE 2845
4.	SINUIJU	XE 1938
5.	*ANTUNG	XE 0931
6.	*TATUNG-KOU	XE 0022
7.	HAMSI	XE 8821
8.	TAECHON	XE 1319
9.	SAAMCHAM	YE 4809
10.	YONPO	CV 7405
11.	SONDOK	CU 7099
12.	SINANJU	YD 1977
13.	YONGDANG-DONG	YD 0954
14.	PYONG-NI	YD 4865
15.	YONGYU WEST	YD 1953
16.	SUNAN	YD 3041
17.	KANGDONG	BU 4437
18.	WONSAN	CU 6936
19.	PYONGYANG EAST	YD 4521
20.	PYONGYANG MAIN	YD 4023
21.	PYONGYANG DT	YD 4021
22.	ONJONG-NI	XD 9307
23.	HWANGJU #2	YC 4361
24.	ANAK	YC 1964
25.	SARIWON SE	YC 4358
26.	SINMAK	BT 6065
27.	PYONGGANG	CT 5154
28.	HAEJU	YC 4409
29.	ONGJIN	YC 1200
30.	HOERYONG	EB 6096
31.	CHONGJIN	EB 6225
	*MANCHURIA	
32.	CHUNGGANGJIN	CB 2427
33.	SINULJU NE	XE 2443

LAST PLANE DOWNED WAS "FIRST"



ON THE LAST DAY OF THE WAR, Capt. Ralph S. Parr, a jet ace from Apple Valley, California, was on a last fighter-sweep near the Yalu before the cease-fire went into effect--looking for enemy planes. He found one and shot down the last plane of the war, ironically an Il-12, first to be shot down in Korea. Map below shows where the Il-12 went down. Pictures above and below, left, show an Il-12 that landed at Haneda AFB, Japan, 23 Sept 52 from Vladivostok.



CONCLUSIONS

Although there was a marked increase in the number of enemy-night sorties observed and engaged over the previous two periods, there were no indications of any change in the enemy's night-intercept effort. The increase in activity was attributed to the medium-bomber effort against Sinuiju and Uiju on three nights during the period, when the majority of the night sighting and engagements were reported. Because of the proximity of these targets to the Antung Area, where the enemy's greatest GCI-control capability exists, an increase in the number of enemy night-intercepts was anticipated. END

The ROUNDUP'S "Enemy Air Activity" article has been written, in the past, to cover day-to-day enemy air activity over Korea. With the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the article contained in this issue of the ROUNDUP will be the last of its kind. It is anticipated that the article in the next issue of the ROUNDUP will contain a resume of the total air activities for the Korean conflict.

SUMMARY OF ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY



REPORTING PERIODS	31 MAY – 6 JUN 53	7 JUN – 13 JUN 53	14 JUN – 20 JUN 53	21 JUN – 27 JUN 53	28 JUN – 4 JUL 53	5 JUL – 11 JUL 53	12 JULY – 19 JULY 53	20 JULY – 27 JULY 53
DESTROYED	10	8	17	17	22	2	24	24
PROBABLE	1	3	3	1	3	1	2	2
DAMAGED	7	3	16	9	16	9	13	0

MIGs SIGHTED MIGs ENGAGED NIGHT SORTIES



ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT SITUATION

THE final period of hostilities was marked by an unusual amount of antiaircraft redeployment in North Korea. In the forward areas, the buildup of AW (automatic weapons of less than 75mm caliber)continued, but guns (antiaircraft cannon, 75mm or larger caliber) rose to a record high of 71 pieces on 20 July, then declined to a total of 53 pieces. Currently, 53 guns and 216 AW are employed in these areas; the single GLR (gun-laying radar) was removed. In the latter part of the period, a sizeable shift of antiaircraft equipment was noted, from the Pyonggang to the Kumsong area. Forward displacement was light and involved the movement of six guns and four AW in the Kumsong area approximately 5,000 meters south. This indicates that the enemy would not have displaced his antiaircraft forward, at least until his gains were consolidated and could have been held.

In the heavily-defended areas at Pyongyang and along the Yalu River at Simuiju and Suiho Dam, three GLR, 24 guns, and 20 AW were removed.

Twelve guns were added to the west coast MSRs, but 20 AW were removed. Four guns and eight AW were installed in the vicinity of the Hukkyo Tunnel in the previously undefended Pyongyang - Sariwon line. When the announced attacks upon the bridges in the Kumuri - Huichon line began, all 12 guns were evacuated. Later, 12 AW were added to the existing three AW, to provide defense against fighter-bombers. The defenses of the Orori - Hagaruri line were reduced from 36 to 24 AW, with no change in the 16 guns (this was the first change in this line since 3 May). Almost half of the defenses of the Wonson - Sepori line were removed, leaving 35 of the 60 AW here.

For the first time in more than a month, changes were noted in the defenses of three dams. Two of these, Toksan and Kuwonga dams, are located


127°
128°
129°
130°
41°
40°
39°
38°
NORTH
KOREA
SEA OF JAPAN
SONGJIN
HAMHUNG
HUNGNAM
KOWON
WONSAN
SEPO-RI
12
4
16
24
24
10
14
15
4
6
4
0
35
10
18
4
9
12
21
41
163
CT
DT
FRONT LINE
AREA
LEGEND
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
HEAVY GUNS
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
HEAVY GUNS, SOME RADAR CONTROLLED
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
HEAVY GUNS, ALL RADAR CONTROLLED
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
NORTH KOREAN AAA SITUATION
NORTH KOREA
38°
10 0 10 20 30 40
MILES

SPECIAL SUBJECT:

A Reprint From *Fortune*...

"*The Red Air Forces*"

COMMENT BY D/I FEAF:

THIS ARTICLE from Fortune, while an interesting and well-researched presentation of available unclassified information on the Soviet air arm, contains a theory which, I feel, is too often harbored by the majority of people, both civilian and military.

I especially noted under the subheading "The Korean Classroom," the often-expounded theory that the Soviets are using Korea to test air-defense theories under operational conditions. This is put forward as an explanation of what is aptly called by FORTUNE a "curious and wasteful employment of air power."

Undoubtedly, the use of Korea as a combat "classroom" has had some bearing on Soviet actions, but I would like to point out that the enemy's scheme of air operations has not necessarily been one of his own choosing. On the contrary, it appears to have been not a matter of choice at all, but one of circumstances--forced on him by our superior plane-pilot combination.

The Soviets wanted to operate from North Korean airfields--this was clearly indicated by their complete construction of three good-sized airstrips in the vicinity of the Chongchon River. This proved to be a forlorn hope: our B-29s were able to render these fields unserviceable, and have kept them in that status. Meanwhile, our F-86s have made the crossing of the Yalu a highly precarious maneuver for the MIGs.

This state of affairs left the enemy only one opportunity: to gain some combat experience for his pilot forces. However, the bulk of the experience being brought back across the Yalu appears to be two-fold: 1) pilots who cross the river, join in combat, and fly home, learn that they can beat the F-86s to the river; 2) those who walk home know they should be less aggressive, or more alert.

The lopsidedness of the air battle has never been more apparent than during the month of June, this year. Seventy-eight confirmed MIG destructions, eleven probables and forty-three damage scores were totaled by Sabrejets in air-to-air battle without a single loss. From the beginning of the war through the end of June, Sabres destroyed 758 MIGs, losing only 74 in air-to-air combat.

It has been months since anything resembling a new air tactic has been introduced by the enemy. His night-interception effort, although greatly improved since the start of the war, has shown no improvement in at least six months and is relatively ineffective. In view of his relative non-aggressiveness, one is led to wonder if the enemy is actually getting any return for his considerable loss.

Month by month, the enemy has been forced to put more and more of his first team into the Korean air war--in the face of continued staggering air losses. It is possible that continued air operations have been designed for propaganda purposes. Liberally garnished with misrepresentation, statistics regarding continued MIG operations in Korea could perhaps be made to look, to the Communist world, like a formidable show

G. M. Malenkov

P. F. Zhigarev

V. A. Sudets

A. Repin

A. Golovanov

These five are among the chief bosses of Soviet air power. Malenkov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, is the Presidium member responsible for military aviation. Zhigarev doubles in brass—as Commander-in-Chief of all the Soviet Air Forces and also the powerful Army Air Forces. Golovanov has bossed the Soviet long-range bomber forces since 1942, but some mystery attaches to his present status. Sudets is presumably No. 2 to Zhigarev. Repin, an engineer, is chief technical director of the Air Forces.

to derive an immediate initial advantage from a large-scale shift of resources to air power. One, of course, was the fact that the Soviet postwar build-up has coincided with the accelerating revolution in aeronautics growing out of the spectacular advances in jet propulsion, swept-back wing designs, electronics, and nuclear fission. The Soviet strategists have therefore been able to reconstitute their air forces around the new technological developments at a time when the inventories of the surviving air forces of the West, notably our own and the British, were swollen with World War II types rapidly being overtaken by technological obsolescence. The other crucial break was the wholesale acquisition of German prototypes, designs, research data, machine tools, and technicians. Soviet aircraft bear the unmistakable imprint of German technical ideas and proficiency.

The best-known example of the success of the Soviet transition is, of course, the MIG-15. Although bearing the initials of the designers Mikoyan and Gurevich, this excellent interceptor is, in essential particulars, a skillful Soviet marriage of the British centrifugal-flow Nene jet engine to a Soviet modification of the German swept-back wing. The Russians acquired a number of Nene engines from the British early in 1947. A year later the MIG-15 went into production. By 1950 production began to soar. Current output of the MIG-15 is estimated to be about 5,000 a year, and the cumulative output may approach 15,000—a first-class production feat, even in U.S. terms.

But the fact that nearly *two score* different models of Soviet jet aircraft have been sighted by Western observers during the past five years supplies evidence that despite the present heavy concentration of Soviet production behind the MIG-15—an interceptor designed primarily to challenge the high-altitude bomber and to fight for air superiority over the battlefield—the other aspects of air power are not being overlooked.

To be sure, the raw statistics of aircraft production and "strength-in-being" are at best only a partial index of the inherent capacity of the Soviet Air Forces for decisive action. What counts is whether the force composition (i.e., the variety and quality of aircraft), the logistical support, the technical competence of Soviet airmen are of an order to enable these Soviet Air Forces to exploit the full versatility of air power.

For example, do the Soviet Air Forces now have the *capability* to conduct from their interior bases a successful long-range atomic action against the U.S. and Western Europe? Is their home air-defense system good enough to blunt the American atomic counteroffensive? Are their tactical air forces organized to give flexible support to the Red Army? In short, has Soviet strategic planning progressed in its mastery of air doctrine to a point where, on some opportunistic occasion, it could be counted upon to derive full advantage from its present preponderance in aircraft numbers? It is these critical aspects of Soviet air power that we shall now examine.

The long-range striking force

Somewhat like the U.S. Strategic Air Command, after which it is modeled, the Soviet long-range air force, *Aviatsiya Dalnevo Deystviya*, occupies a quasi-autonomous status under the Minister of War. Until recently it was under the command of an experienced airman, Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov, who took charge of the force a decade ago after it had disintegrated under the Luftwaffe's blows, and its leader, Lieutenant General Kopets, had committed suicide in disgrace. Golovanov's name has not been mentioned in the Soviet press for several years. It is possible that he has been discarded, but this is not certain.

Whether credit for building ADD to its present strength of about 1,000 Tu-4's belongs to Malenkov or Golovanov, the fact is that a prodigious job has been done. The carrying capacity of the ready force is well in excess of Beria's likely stockpile of atomic weapons; to that extent ADD has been forehanded. Moreover, it has been diligent in developing inside the Soviet periphery and in the Arctic the extensive base structure necessary to support the kind of operations it may be called upon to perform.

Qualitatively, however, the Soviet ADD is one huge question mark. The mainstay of the force, Tupelov's modified B-29, has a low performance relative to current jet types.

craft. Otherwise all is concealed. The vast Soviet-controlled space, extending over 50 degrees of longitude and through 180 degrees of latitude, gives ADD all the room it needs for long-range exercises, and all varieties of climate save the tropical.

However, there is no substitute in air warfare for experience. The fact is that the Soviet long-range air force is untested in war. Its strategic air operations against Germany were generally ineffectual. Golovanov undertook to compress into less than a decade all the hard-bought experience that U.S. and British airmen have accumulated through three decades of trial and error. His raw material was a cadre of airmen who were bad instrument pilots; who had had little experience in long-range operations, especially at night; and who had only a perfunctory knowledge of strategic-bombing theory.

Many of these deficiencies are no doubt being overcome. ADD's capacity to deal heavy blows to U.S. and Western European cities is undoubtedly growing. Yet it is doubtful that ADD can have been driven in so short a time to a point where it has begun to approach the efficiency of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. It does not appear to have an effective radar bombsight. It has had no experience to compare with General Curtis LeMay's in staging his force with great rapidity in and out of bases spread across the world. Probably its most serious deficiency, at this stage of the art of long-range air warfare, is its total lack of bases beyond the Soviet rim. Here LeMay has a decisive and growing advantage over his Soviet counterpart.

Soviet air defense

The enormous build-up of the Soviet home air defenses (*Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona*) is a grudging acknowledgment of the American atomic advantage. For the defense of the Soviet homeland, Colonel General Ivan Klimov (a hero of the wartime air defense of Moscow) commands an interceptor force three-fourths as big as the entire NATO tactical air force. His force operates nearly 3,000 aircraft, mostly MIG-15's. In addition, the refitting of the Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian satellite air forces with Soviet jet interceptors suggests that the Soviet air-defense system is being extended in depth to the outermost perimeter.

But like the long-range striking force, PVO is untried and untested in war. The Luftwaffe never at-

begun to do before them, to guided missiles—specifically to a Soviet improvement of the German *Wasserfall*, a ground-to-air rocket that was a vest-pocket edition of the famous long-range V-2.

The Kremlin has lavished far more resources on its air-defense system than we have on our own. The rapid extension of the early-warning network around the Soviet perimeter, the parallel development of radar ground-interception techniques for maneuvering the air defenders into position, the feverish concentration on interceptors, all seemingly point to a decision on the Kremlin's part to complete the system within the near future. That it should then be able to take heavy toll of our B-29's, B-50's, and B-36's is admitted by U.S. airmen. Meanwhile, however, the same electronic and propulsion techniques that are strengthening the defense are also fortifying the penetrative opportunities of the attack.

As General LeMay's retaliatory force shifts to the faster, higher-altitude B-47 and B-52 jets, and as Boeing's and Convair's designers move toward supersonic bombers, General Klimov's defense problems become a kind of moving equation that must plague him with technical problems even more formidable than those of the ADD. He has the task of protecting from a crushing air attack one-sixth of the world's surface. In the opinion of Western airmen, it is an impossible task, except by the massing of fighters, artillery, guided missiles, and electronic gear on a scale that would tax Soviet industry to the breaking point.

Tactical air forces

If Stalin's "falcons" are novices in air defense and strategic bombing, they have had plenty of experience in tactical air warfare. This was their forte in the last war and it so remains. The Soviet Army Air Force, under General Zhigarev, is undoubtedly the most massive air organization of its kind in existence. The present front-line strength approaches 12,000 fighter aircraft, more than half of them jets, distributed among a number of "air armies." Another two years should see this force entirely jet-equipped. To its strength should be added the Soviet naval air arm, lacking carriers and therefore land-based, with a front-line strength of several thousand tactical aircraft, trained in part for the same general mission.

As during the last war, the Soviet tactical air armies are organized in the main to provide close support for the ground forces. In contrast

tons by 1956. Last year the U.S. aircraft industry consumed about 100,000 tons of aluminum (12 per cent of the national production) in producing about 9,000 aircraft. Because Soviet aircraft are much lighter than comparable U.S. types, the Soviet aluminum supply goes further. But the trend to higher performance demands weightier machines, and the pinch on the Soviet aluminum supply is certain to tighten steadily. The World War II peak output of 36,000 aircraft no longer provides an accurate index of the Soviet production potential. That rate was made possible largely by lend-lease aluminum and a lavish use of plywood construction.

One final point intrigues the speculations of Western airmen concerning the Soviet air potential —its dependence upon Western technology. During the 1946–50 period Soviet air power derived much benefit from leftover U.S. machine tools, designs, and production techniques, and, in jet-aircraft and guided-missile research, from German technicians. However, after six or seven years in the Soviet hinterland, these technicians must have used up their original research, and, cut off from the thinking of other German and Western technical men, they may no longer be turning up new ideas.

Hence the next and imminent stage in aircraft technology, introducing supersonic craft, guided missiles of many kinds, and revolutionary electronic techniques, should establish whether or not Soviet aviation possesses an innate genius for design and production. If in this coming stage, two or three years away, Soviet aircraft design should re-enact the forward leap of the MIG-15 over World War II types, and if meanwhile Plan V should make possible the broadening of the industrial base, it will be an ominous sign of the Soviet capacity for world action. END



OTHER FAR EAST AREAS

"....and also through the Chinese Liberation Army will assume responsibility of assisting in the carrying out of the liberation of Southeast Asia, so as to effectuate the completion of the liberation of the whole of Asia."

(Article 2 of Alleged Sino-Soviet Special Friendship Pact, 12 Feb 50.)

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

POLITICAL ACTIVITY in the Associated States during the past two weeks was overshadowed by a striking French airborne-seaborne operation against a primary Vietminh supply-point at Lang Son near the Kwangsi border (see"Military", below). There was, however, quite a flurry of political activity during the first half of the period, attendant upon the 3 July declaration by France concerning her intention to "perfect" the independence and sovereignty of the three States. Vietnamese government reaction to the French pronouncement was generally favorable and probably about what was expected and desired by France, although Vietnam stressed "total" independence and transfer. A pledge was made by Vietnam that their response would be total mobilization of their country's energies for the war which had now become their war.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE SEEN LUKE WARM

The general public apparently felt luke warm about the declaration and there was a liberal amount of skepticism in most quarters. The Vietnamese public was adhering to their customary "wait-and-see" attitude, pending implementation of alleged French intentions. In order to dispel some of this skepticism, the French High Commissariat in Vietnam issued an explanatory statement 10 July, in which the earlier announcement was termed a solemn statement of French desire to find a new basis for French-Vietnamese relations in conformity with present reality. Particularly stressed was the French intention to transfer to Vietnam those powers retained by France, and the invitation of France to Vietnam to agree on her future ties with France.

The principal concern of the Vietnamese Government now appears to be the reported order in which the three States are to be considered: Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Bao Dai, Vietnamese Chief-of-State, would prefer that Vietnam be last so as to preclude his having to make an early commitment on demands. Furthermore, if the Vietnam and Laos agreements are signed first, there is a strong possibility that King Norodom of Cambodia would demand and get better terms. While Vietnam would expect to receive gains equivalent to those granted to previously either or both of the other two states, the top leaders of the coun-

try have been disinclined to place themselves firmly on the record as to their minimum demands.

In Cambodia, meanwhile, government and public reactions were the reverse of those in Vietnam. While the declaration apparently satisfied the majority of Cambodians, there was no indication that King Norodom was going to declare his unequivocal acceptance. It was believed, however, that he would accept the opportunity to present his demands in more normal channels than he has heretofore. He would probably get the point of being placed last in order for discussions, but the opportunity to outdo Vietnam in practical gains would doubtless be considered sufficient compensation.

OPERATION HIRONDELLE (MILITARY)

Military activity during the period was highlighted by operation "Hirondelle" (Swallow) launched by the French Union Forces on 17 July. Dropping three parachute battalions in very good weather with a minimum of drop casualties, the French apparently caught the Vietminh completely by surprise. The drop-zone was strafed by eleven fighter-type aircraft prior to the drop, but no significant resistance developed. Two battalions were assigned to destroy Vietminh supply dumps at and near Langson (2150N/10644E) as well as blow up key bridges across the Ky Cung River in order to cut one of the chief supply links with Communist China. The third battalion was dropped at Loc Binh (2145N/10655E) at 1800 in order to assist the withdrawal of the two battalions dropped in the morning.

In order to furnish diversion and support in force for the withdrawing parachute troops, a mobile group, including a tank platoon and a company of engineers, landed at Point Pagode (1154N/10912E) at about drop time, and the assembly of the total striking force was completed by 19 July, at Tien Yen (2120N/10724E).

The French consider this operation a complete success. In addition to the destruction of dumps and bridges, the friendly forces captured a significant amount of materiel. Furthermore, Joint Intelligence has reliable information that as the result of the attack, the Vietminh have removed supplies from Dong Dang (northwest of Langson) across the border into China. It is also believed that valuable and definite information will be gleaned from the captured materiel as to the Chinese aid situation.

PREPARATION FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD

Throughout the remaining areas of Indochina, it was apparent that both the French and Vietminh were utilizing the relative calm of the monsoon season for regrouping, training and resupply in preparation for the coming operational period, beginning in late September or early October. Although on a reduced scale, harrassing and ambush activity by the Vietminh continued. Their extensive road mining constituted the most serious menace to all traffic, particularly within the Tonkin Delta Region.

The Vietminh are assigned the following current capabilities by the French Joint Intelligence Staff: 1) to attack the Tonkin Delta from the northwest with two divisions plus artillery support for a period of five to fifteen days; 2) to attack from the Quang Tri (1645N/-10711E)-Vinh (1840N/10540E) area in the direction of Thakhek (1724N/-10448E); and 3) to make various limited-objective attacks.

well into Tibet. Source heard that the Chinese Communists want to send these personnel back to India, but does now know the present status of this matter.

When the Communists occupied Tibet, all of the Tibetans and Chinese in Kalimpong immediately turned pro-Communist. Since then, however, they have been gradually turning anti-Communist, and most of them are now anti-Communist.

In Tibet, there has been a similar change of sentiment and source believes the Tibetans now display open hostility to the Chinese Communists, although this does not reach the point of anti-Communist guerrilla activity or other overt resistance.

Source had heard that the Communists wanted or planned to start publishing a Tibetan-language newspaper in Lhasa. Heretofore, the only newspaper in that language has been a monthly paper published in Kalimpong by a local Tibetan. An average of about 300 copies of each issue of his newspaper has been sent to Lhasa each month.

ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION

Kalimpong is the southern terminus of the caravan route to Lhasa. This caravan route is open all year round, and the trip each way takes about twenty-one days. Mules, burrows, and occasionally sheep are used as beasts of burdens. No yaks are used, since they cannot be used much below 8,000 or 9,000 feet altitude. Kalimpong is at an elevation of 4,000, while Gangtok (capital of Sikkim) and Darjeeling are at about 6,000 feet. Caravans move through Kalimpong every day, ten to twenty beasts per caravan. The goods carried down from Tibet are musk, fur, and yak tails. Caravans returning to Tibet carry all types of goods: lots of cloth from India, salt, tinware, tinned foods, hardware, flashlights and batteries, and so on.

There was talk immediately after the Communist occupation that the Soviet Union would no longer permit goods to leave Tibet for anywhere other than Russia, and it was expected that there would be a slackening in the trade through Kalimpong. Actually, however, this did not come about, probably because it is so difficult to move goods from Lhasa over the other caravan routes. Only the route to Kalimpong is open all year round.

The other two main routes from Lhasa are: 1) through Sikang to Kangting (Ta-taien-lu), in the eastern part of that province; 2) through Sikang to Kikiang, in northwestern Yunnan.

Both of these require about three months for a one-way trip, and there can thus be only one round trip per year for a caravan on either of these routes, since in winter, they are, for all practical purposes, impassable. Thus, it is logical that most of the trade between Tibet and the outside should be by way of Kalimpong or Gangtok.

There are two passes on the border, north of Kalimpong and Gangtok, respectively. Their names are Nangthula and Jelepla, and they are about forty or fifty miles apart, but source could not recall which was on the trail from Kalimpong and which from Gangtok.

1) The route north from Kalimpong is passable for automobiles for one day's mule march (about twenty miles), and it is jeepable up to almost a stone's throw of the permanent snow in the pass, which is actually on the border. When source left Kalimpong, the bridge twenty miles north of the town was washed out and had not been replaced.

2) A good gravel automobile road

NATIONALIST CHINA

THE following information on the Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA) was briefed and extracted from a special report prepared by G-2,AFFE. It is presented at this time for the information and edification of all Air Force personnel. At the present time, the CNA is celebrating its Sixth Anniversary.

In line with recommendations by MAAG, Formosa, the CNA began a reorganization of their ground forces during the summer of 1952. This reorganization was completed in late November 1952. This change is no panacea for all the problems which plague the army of free China. However, it is a step in the right direction, and has undoubtedly increased the inherent strength of the Nationalist Forces. It provides a foundation with a sound organization concept to build on. Much remains to be done, however, in the field of supply, logistics,equipment,maintenance, transportation and command, before the Nationalists will be ready to establish and maintain a beachhead on the mainland of China.

Sufficient quantities of equipment are on hand, or will be on hand in the near future, for the ground forces to meet their training requirements only. They are almost entirely dependent on the United States for military equipment. At the moment the small arms of the army units are a miscellaneous collection obtained from many sources and nationalities. They are at present in the process of replacing the non-standard items with additional weapons allocated to their use from United States military stocks. It is estimated that the present logistical support would sustain the CNA approximately ten days in defense of Formosa. The following figures represent the approximate amount of weapons and equipment presently available from all sources for the ground forces:



STUDENTS at the Chinese Nationalist Army infantry school on Formosa receive,as part of their training, instruction in the operation of U.S. 30-calibre machine gun. The instructor(standing) is a captain in Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's forces.

WEAPONS

Machine guns	14,000
Rifles and carbines	101,000
Mortars	28,000
Artillery	700

VEHICLES

Jeeps	700
Trucks (3/4 and 2½ ton)	3,600
Armored (half-tracks)	700
Tanks	450

The ten reorganized armies recently completed a 13-week training program which was designed to convert the Chinese Army to a U.S. type T/O&

On 15 June, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) received 11 F-84G jet aircraft as part of the U.S. Military-Aid Program. However, the U.S. Air Attache reports this week that the second shipment of jets is due very shortly and will bring the CNAF jet strength up to 21 F-84Gs and four T-33 Trainers.

Having received two T-33 Trainers from the U.S. early this spring CNAF organized a jet-training course with a small group of carefully selected students. In addition, a group of students who could understand English were sent to the U.S., also for basic jet-training. Only recently, 17 of these jet-trained pilots returned to Formosa to act as instructors along with fellow airmen who were recent graduates of the first jet-trained class.

CHINESE NATIONALISTS HIT TUNG-SHAN ISLAND



ON THE MORNING of 16 July, 17 C-46 aircraft of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), escorted by eight F-47s, departed from Hsin-chu, (northwest coast of Formosa) for Tung-shan Island (2340N/11725E) (see map). The drop was made by 612 paratroopers at 0600 after the jump was delayed approximately one hour due to darkness and fog.

The U.S. Air Attache reports that the paratroopers did not encounter any antiaircraft or aircraft opposition. However, one of the es-

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

DATE: 10-23 JULY 1953

ON 10 July 1953, Fifth Air Force began a new series of attacks to slowdown the enemy's transportation system. The initial attack was made by Bomber Command B-29s against the Sinanju bridge-complex on the night of 10-11 July. Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers subsequently attacked 18 principal rail-and-road bridges along the Chongchon River from Sinanju north to Huichon. The following table shows the coordinates of bridges hit:

BRIDGES ATTACKED

Sinanju Bridge-Complex YD 242 885

SINGLE RAIL BRIDGES

YE 446 033	BV 657 439	BV 687 478

SINGLE ROAD BRIDGES

YD 360 930	YD 350 944	YD 335 913
YD 316 909	YE 447 016	BV 533 264
BV 693 468	BV 472 326	BV 591 342
BV 459 169	BV 455 175	BV 669 440
BV 594 358*	BV 615 381	BV 453 170



*ROAD BRIDGE BETWEEN KUNURI AND SINANJU — ONE OF THE FIFTEEN SINGLE ROAD BRIDGES DESTROYED BY FIFTH AIR FORCE FIGHTER-BOMBERS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD



RAILROAD BRIDGE NORTHWEST OF KUNURI ON CHONGCHON RIVER—ONE OF THREE SINGLE RR BRIDGES DESTROYED DURING REPORTING PERIOD BY FIFTH AIR FORCE FIGHTER - BOMBERS



YONGMI-DONG BRIDGE COMPLEX. This photo cover was taken on 19 July and is the latest cover available. The attack of this complex and the Sinanju complex, which is shown in detail on the next two pages, was carried out by B-29s of FEAF Bomber Command on the night of 10/11 July. Although this photo cover doesn't show Baker-65 rail line and the East by-pass, it does show five of the lines and the destruction done to them. Destruction areas are indicated on this photograph by the rectangular boxes.

NEXT TWO PAGES SHOW SINANJU COMPLEX

COMPLEX



THIS TWO-PAGE photo of the Sinanju Bridge-Complex was taken on 19 July. It shows rail lines Baker-67,68,74, and 75 in an unserviceable condition. Baker-66 line is also shown unserviceable in this photo, but it is believed that it was probably in a serviceable condition by 20 July.


ROLLING STOCK
DATE: 10-23 JULY 1953
TOTAL-5,238
MANCHURIA
JAPAN SEA
KOREA BAY
NORTH KOREA
LEGEND
50-100 UNITS
100-200 UNITS
MILES
125°
126°
127°
128°
129°
130°
43°
42°
41°
40°
39°
38°
TUMEN
HOERYONG
NAJIN
MUSAN
CHONGJIN
HYESANJIN
MANPOJIN
KANGGYE
KILCHU
SONGJIN
SAKCHU
SINUIJU
HUICHON
POHANG-NI
NAMSI-DONG
HAMHUNG
HUNGNAM
SINANJU
KUNURI
TOKCHON
SUNCHON
SAMDONG-NI
KOWON
YANGDOK
WONSAN
SOPO
SAMDUNG
PYONGYANG
CHINNAMPO
SEPO-RI
KOSONG
SARIWON
PYONGGANG
NAMCHONJOM
CHANGYON
HAEJU
ONGJIN
KAESONG
YONAN


LOCATED RAIL CUTS
5TH AF & NAVY CLAIMS
DATE: 10-23 JULY 1953
MANCHURIA
KOREA BAY
JAPAN SEA
NORTH KOREA
TUMEN
HOERYONG
NAJIN
MUSAN
CHONGJIN
HYESANJIN
MANPOJIN
KANGGYE
KILCHU
SONGJIN
SAKCHU
SINUIJU
NAMSI-DONG
HUICHON
POHANG-NI
HAMHUNG
HUNGNAM
TOKCHON
SINANJU
KUNURI
SUNCHON
SAMDONG-NI
KOWON
YANGDOK
WONSAN
SOPO
SAMDUNG
PYONGYANG
CHINNAMPO
SARIWON
SEPO-RI
KOSONG
PYONGGANG
NAMCHONJOM
CHANGYON
HAEJU
ONGJIN
KAESONG
YONAN
NOT LOCATED — 13
FIFTH AF — 58
NAVY — 118
TOTAL — 189
MILES


VEHICLE SIGHTINGS
DATE: 10 - 23 JULY 1953
LEGEND
TOP FIGURES DENOTE PERCENTAGES OF OVERALL VEHICLES SIGHTED BETWEEN POINTS INDICATED. LOWER FIGURES DENOTE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES SIGHTED BETWEEN POINTS INDICATED. FIGURES FOR SECONDARY ROUTES ARE COMBINED WITH THOSE OF MAIN ARTERIES.
TOTAL - 28,927
OFF MSR 2.4 / 700
125°
126°
127°
128°
41°
40°
39°
38°
MANPOJIN
SINUIJU
HUICHON
KUNU-RI
SINANJU
TOKCHON
HAMHUNG
WONSAN
YANGDOK
MAJON-NI
PYONGYANG
SINGOSAN
KOSONG
SINGYE
SIBYON-NI
KUMHWA
CHORWON
HAEJU
KAESONG
KOREA BAY
SEA OF JAPAN
YELLOW SEA
.2 / 71
0 / 0
4.8 / 1385
1.8 / 512
5.3 / 1526
3.9 / 1138
3.3 / 964
10.7 / 3058
13.1 / 3783
5.7 / 1640
2.2 / 640
14.0 / 4058
10.4 / 3005
22.2 / 6420
NORTH KOREA
10 0 10 20 30
MILES

TABLE "A"

CUMULATIVE LOSSES AND DAMAGE INFLICTED UPON THE ENEMY BY AIRCRAFT, ATTACHED AND ASSIGNED, UNDER FEAF OPERATIONAL CONTROL. DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE TO ENEMY AIRCRAFT CLAIMS WILL BE FOUND IN THE AIRCRAFT LOSSES TABLE, SECTION I

ITEMS	DURING PERIOD 0001/12 Jul TO 2400/1,25 Jul 1953		CUMULATIVE TOTALS - PERIOD 26 JUN 50 TO 25 Jul 1953	
	DESTROYED	DAMAGED	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
BLDGS-WHSES	510	62	117,620	88,485
VEHICLES-TRUCKS	995	190	82,760	33,132
LOCOMOTIVES	1	-	963	1,169
RR CARS	182	153	10,378	22,656
TROOPS	85	-	184,817	-
TUNNELS	-	1	66	936
BRIDGES	39	94	1,158	3,043
BOATS	1	-	593	820
OIL STORAGE TANKS	-	-	16	3
	CUTS		CUMULATIVE CUTS	
RAILROAD CUTS	62		28,608	
	DESTROYED & DAMAGED		DESTROYED & DAMAGED	
GUN POSITIONS	208		16,267	

NOTE: The figures contained in this table are derived from "confirmed" figures wherever possible. When these figures are not available, "flash" figures are used. This method provides the using agency with the latest figures available, but will cause certain inconsistencies to become apparent if compared with statistics from previous weeks. These figures are revised as soon as "confirmed" figures become available. It is recommended that this information not be used for planning.

ADDED TANKS FOR ADDED RANGE. A line of F-86 Sabrejets of the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing in Korea await attachment of wing tanks which will give them longer cruising range in their flights over North Korea in quest of MIGs. When Sabrejet pilots sight the MIGs, they release their wing tanks, thereby gaining added speed as they move to engage the enemy pilots.

FINAL CHECK. A loadmaster of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing of Combat Cargo, gives cargo destined for Korea a final check before takeoff. Loadmasters also make continual in-flight checks on daily cargo runs.

RRIER!

START HERE AND READ LEFT

1



JUST BEFORE HITTING THE BARRIER. In a test of the landing-cable barrier at a base in Japan, an F-86 Sabrejet is shown here just before making contact with the arresting device. As this picture was taken, the Sabrejet was traveling at an approximate speed of 140 miles per hour.

CABLE BAR



JET HITS BARRIER. In this photo, the nose and the nose gear of the F-86 Sabrejet have made contact and gone through the cable barrier. This has triggered the arresting cable, which is about to spring up and engage the main landing gear of the plane and begin to slow the plane's roll.

ACK THE



CABLE ABOUT TO GRAB HOLD. At the time this picture was taken, the Sabrejet had torn its way through the nylon webbing of the barrier and the arresting cable had made a direct contact with the main landing gear. In another instant, the cable will tighten, slowing the Sabrejet's speed.

CAN'T CR

4



THE CABLE PULLS TAUT. The front part of the Sabrejet has passed out of the picture in this photo and the arresting cable has now been pulled taut. The F-86 has begun to drag the heavy linked chains stretched along the sides of the runway. Drag will increasingly slow the plane's roll.

THE JETS



RAPID SLOW-DOWN. Only a small part of the tail section of the Sabrejet shows in this picture, as the jet, which can be brought to a complete stop in about 500 feet, carries along the heavy drag chains which halt the plane, saving both the pilot and his $240,000 aircraft for another attack.

DISTRIBUTION

CINCFE, APO 500	1
G-2, HQ, FEC, APO 500	18
CINCAFE, APO 633, PM, N.Y.	4
SAC XRAY, c/o CofS FEC, APO 500	1
OIC, AFFE, Medical Section, APO 500	1
OIC, FEC, Document Research Sect., APO 500	5
OIC, FEC, J-2 Div., Estimates Br., APO 500	2
OIC, Oprs Research Office, G-3, HQ, FEC	1
OIC, Oprs Analysis Office, APO 710	1
OIC, AFFE, Psywar Section, APO 343	1
CG, 8th Army, APO 301	10
Deputy CofS, Operations, HQ, FEC	1
CG, 40th AAA Brigade, APO 713	1
CG, 44th AAA Brigade (Prov), APO 60	2
CO, 227th AAA Gp, APO 301	1
CG, XVI Corps, APO 14	1
OIC, G-3, AFFE (Main) APO 343	1
Dist. Sec., D/I Old Post Off. Bldg., Hq, USAF, Wash 25, D.C.	49
Dir, AU Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala	1
Comdr, MATS, Andrews AFB, Wash 25, D.C.	24
D/I, CONAC, Mitchel AFB, N.Y.	1
CG, SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska	51
CG, TAC, Langley AFB, Virginia	10
CG, EADF, Stewart AFB, N.Y.	20
CG, WADF, Hamilton AFB, Calif	7
CG, CADF, Kansas City, Missouri	32
CG, JADF, APO 710	41
CG, AWS, Andrews AFB, Wash 25, D.C.	1
CG, SMAMA, McClellan AFB, Calif	1
CG, USAFSS, Brooks AFB, Texas	1
CG, USAFE, APO 633, PM N.Y.	92
CG, ATRC, Scott AFB, Illinois	1
CG, Tech Trng AF, Gulfport, Miss	11
CG, Flying Trng AF, Waco, Texas	1
CG, Crew Trng AF, Randolph AFB, Texas	11
CG, Avn Eng Force, Wolters AFB, Texas	1
CG, Air Proving Ground Cmd, Eglin AFB, Fla	1
CG, AAC, APO 942, PM, Seattle, Wash	10
CG, Travis AFB, Calif	1
CG, 2d AF, Barksdale AFB, La	1
CG, 3d AF, APO 125, PM, N.Y.	22
CG, 4th AF, Hamilton AFB, Calif	2
CG, 5th AF, APO 970	39
CG, 8th AF, Carswell AFB, Texas	1
CG, 9th AF, Pope AFB, Fort Bragg, N.C.	9
CG, 13th AF, APO 74	15
CG, 15th AF, March AFB, Calif	1
CG, 18th AF, Donaldson AFB, S.C.	9
CG, 20th AF, APO 239	13
CG, 5th AD, APO 118, PM, N.Y.	1
CG, 7th AD, APO 125, PM, N.Y.	7
CG, 21st AD, Forbes AFB, Topeka, Kansas	2
CG, 315th AD, (CC), APO 959	14
CG, FEALOGFOR, APO 323	17
CG, FEAF Bomber Command, APO 328	8
CG, 6319 Air Base Wg, APO 334	4
CG, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild AFB, Wash	1
CG, 307th Bomb Wing, APO 239-1	1
CG, 91st Composite Wing, APO 954	3
CO, 2143d Air Wea Wing, APO 925	5
CO, 6004th Air Int Sv Sq, APO 925	2
CO, 766th AC & W Sq, Limestone, Maine	1
CO, Hq, 2d Photo Sq, 1350th Photo Gp (DOC) ATTN: Capt. Leavich, Adj., APO 328	1
CG, ARDC, PO Box 1395, Baltimore 3, Md	3
CG, ADC, Ent AFB, Colo Springs, Colo	2
CO, 511th MI Sv Co, APO 59	1
CG, USAF Air Ground Ops School, N.C.	1
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LITTLE RED RIDING HOODNIK

. . . . A FAIRY TALE FOR MODERN TOTSKIS

Editor's Note: The authorship of the modernized fairy tale printed below is causing considerable discussion, one school maintaining that it was written by Josef Vissarionovich Andersen, another holding, with equal heat, that the author was Hans Christian Malenkov. The ROUNDUP inclines to go along with a third widely bruited theory, namely that the author is an anonymous feature writer on the Washington (D.C.) Post. Berlin dispatches have recently reported that East German Communists have begun rewriting classical fairy tales to "purge them of bourgeois tendencies" and make their heroes into Communist revolutionaries. This indication that fairy tales, as well as history, are being rewritten by the Communists, is an alarming trend, of which the ROUNDUP, in reprinting the story below, takes due note.

ONCE UPON A TIME there was a liberated young woman named Natasha Petrovna Riding Hood, called Red for short, who was a member of the Party fraction on a kolkhoz near Minsk.

One day, as she was preparing to attend a komsomol discussion on group elaboration of the ideological unity among the Lumpenproletariat, the Commissar spoke to her.

"Little Red," he said, "I have an important assignment for you. The head of the shop nucleus at Topmost Steppe has notified us that he is fresh out of dialectical materialism. Pack up some in your little rucksack and take it to him."

"Yes, Comrade Commissar," said Little Red. "His office is at 123 Rudolph Slansky Street, is it not?"

"Oh, no,' corrected the Commissar, "that was a month ago. Since then, he has had several other addresses. One was 123 Klement Gottwald Street and now it is 123 Antonin Zapotocky Street. But I think you better check

again when you get to town, because by this evening it may well be 123 Vilem Siroky Street.

"And be careful on your trip," he continued, "for the woods between here and Topmost Steppe are full of Fascist beasts."

"I'll be careful,"said Little Red, as she packed up the agitprop and set off on her journey.

GEORGEI PORGEI ENTERS STOREI

On the way, sure enough, she was accosted by a capitalist exploiter named Georgei Porgei Wolf. "Where are you going, Little Red?" asked Wolf.

"I'm going to Topmost Steppe to give the head of the shop nucleus all this dialectical materialism," she replied.

At that, Wolf jumped into a jeep which he had stolen from some Heroes of the Red Army who. in turn, had once liberated it from Yankee imperialist germ warriors, and took a shortcut to Topmost Steppe. Once there, he quickly liquidated the head of the shop nucleus and sat at his desk.

Soon afterward, Little Red arrived in the office and was startled by the appearance of the man she saw.

"What big boots you have, Comrade Head of the Shop Nucleus!" she exclaimed.

"All the better to uplift the workers," Wolf replied.

"What a big dollar-sign you have on your shirt front, Comrade Head of the Shop Nucleus!" said Little Red.

"All the better to make a good impression at the Torgsin store," said Wolf.

"What a culturally backward attitude oriented toward the social oppression of the working masses you have, Comrade Head of the Shop Nucleus!" she declared.

"All the better to reduce you to medieval serfdom," Wolf shouted, and at once jumped up and began to chase Little Red around the room.

But at that moment, a handsome young Stakhanovite worker who had just finished his day's job of moving a couple of mountains and rerouting a river with atomic energy looked in the window and saw what was going on.

"What music is this I hear coming out of your radio?" he shouted.

Georgei Porgei Wolf cowered in silence. He knew his counter-revolutionary game was up.

"It is nothing other than Shostakovich's Ninth Symphony, condemned for its bourgeois formalism by the Music Splinter of the Cultural Cell of the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Party Presidium," the young Stakhanovite continued. "Listen to those regressive rhythms, that anti-proletarian counterpoint. Why, this

OIL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL

man is no aparatchik; he is a Bukharinite deviationist and maybe even a Trotskyite with an entirely menshevik inner content. We will purge him at once."

With that,he leaped in the window, seized a bottle of castor oil and forced the contents down Wolf's warmongering throat.

Little Red, saved from the fate of becoming a decadent parasite, beamed at the Stakhanovite. "In my book, Comrade," she said, "you get good Marx."

The young man smiled back with a socially valid expression. He said, "It comes from knowing all the Engels."

They lived happily ever after, and exceeded all their production quotas. END

GET ON THE BALL

NOT BEHIND IT!

BE SECURITY CONSCIOUS

HQ FEAF OFFICE OF THE AIR PROVOST MARSHAL (IG)