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STATUS REPORT

I. DISPERSAL

Approved Objective: Disperse SAC forces to one (1) HB Squadron with tankers per base and one (1) MB Wing with tankers per base by end FY 1962.

Immediate Objective: In consideration of fund limitations this Headquarters with SAC concurrence is planning to first achieve the dispersal of heavy bomb wings to one squadron per base as a matter of priority.

Status of Objective: As reflected in P-59-1 series of programming documents in the end FY 1961 position SAC forces will be dispersed in accordance with the approved objective except as follows:

- A. Two medium bomb wings will still be co-located on 8 bases. (Portsmouth, Plattsburgh, Hunter, Homestead, Schilling, Dyess, Lincoln and Lockbourne AFB)
- B. One heavy bomb squadron will be co-located with one medium bomb wing at each of three bases. (Barksdale, Little Rock and Forbes AFB)
- C. Two heavy bomb squadrons will be co-located at three bases. (Westover, Loring and Fairchild AFB)

II. ALERT

Approved Objective: The concept of maintaining a portion of SAC's heavy and medium strike force on constant alert is approved in principle. Manning of SAC's bomber units to 1.5 aircraft/crew ratio is to be accomplished as a matter of Air Force priority.

Status:

- A. From a personnel standpoint the Air Force is programming to train and provide sufficient crews to man SAC at the required crew to aircraft ratio.
- B. From a facilities standpoint the status of alert facilities for SAC can best be summarized by quoting a recent AFCIE letter to CINCSAC. (See Tab A for details.)

DECLASSIFIED  
By: Air Force Declassification Office  
08 June 2010

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"1. This headquarters approved the SAC alert concept in principle only for implementation within resources available to your command. Exception to this policy has been made where additional apron pavement is required. The new pavement can be constructed in the alert configuration. There has been no specific approval for implementation of the alert concept through the Military Construction Program to date.

2. Until the results of the Hunter tests are submitted and evaluated, no final decision can be made as to what implementation of the SAC alert concept might be made in the FY 59 MCP. However, a package of \$25 million has been allocated against SAC alert facilities in the FY 59 Military Construction Program. It is anticipated that these facilities may be alert ready crew facilities."

C. Regarding SAC efforts to program alert facilities the following summarizes recent actions.

1. By message to this Headquarters dated 20 May 1957 (Tab B) SAC requested comment or concurrence in the intention of that command to include all authorized alert deficiencies in the FY 1959 MCP.
2. In reply (Tab B) this Headquarters stated that "... it is evident that fund limitations will not accommodate all alert deficiencies and that duplication of facilities will not be fair competition for hard core requirements. This circumstance necessitates present policy prohibiting programming of alert pavements at installations where sufficient aircraft parking area exists. Its intent is to eliminate projects which obviously will not survive review by higher authority."
3. Alert Pavement Programmed to Date (B-52 Only)

FY 57

Amarillo, Texas  
Beale, California  
Grand Forks, North Dakota  
Mather, California

Minot, North Dakota  
Bergstrom, Texas  
Columbus, Mississippi

FY 58

Dow, Maine  
Guffiss, New York  
Robins, Georgia  
Blytheville, Arkansas

Greenville, Mississippi  
Seymour-Johnson, N. Carolina  
Sheppard, Texas

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FY 59

No alert pavement proposed.

III. ALERT THROUGH DISPERSAL

During the preliminary Commander's Conference on 8 October 1956, General LeMay agreed that civilian as well as military bases could be used in support of alert through dispersal. Therefore, SAC has requested approval of this Headquarters to survey military and civilian bases which appear to fulfill SAC requirements. By Indorsement, this Headquarters pointed out to SAC that: (1) this concept goes beyond approved objectives; (2) generates an entire set of new problems; (3) requests additional information in order that the "Alert Through Dispersal" concept may be evaluated; and (4) it can not be anticipated that fund authorization can be obtained to begin implementation of the concept prior to the FY 1960 MCP. (See Tab C for details)

3 Inclosures

- Tab A - Ltr to AFCIE  
dtd 8 May 57  
w/1st Ind
- Tab B - CAFIN 62418  
dtd 21 May 57  
w/CAFCOUT 0596-M  
dtd 6 Jun 57
- Tab C - Ltr to C/S  
dtd 21 May 57  
w/1st Ind

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B/END-PT

3 MAY 1957

SUBJECT: (U) SAC Alert Facilities

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations  
Headquarters USAF  
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your headquarters Secret message AFCEH 54346 dated 3 April 1957, which indicated that approval of the SAC alert concept did not constitute approval of the required supporting items.  
(Secret)

2. This headquarters is gravely concerned as to the implications of the above referenced message since previous correspondence on subject facilities indicated that the requirement for both alert hangars and personnel shelters had been recognized by your headquarters. A brief discussion of this correspondence is as follows:

a. Requirement for alert facilities.

(1) This headquarters secret letter dated 21 March 1956, subject: (Secret) "Acceleration of Navy Dispersal Program", requested your headquarters to review and furnish comments and/or concurrence on "Special SAC Requirements, B-52 and KC-135 Satellite Bases", and was furnished as Inclosure 2. Both alert hangars and personnel shelters were included in these requirements.

(2) This headquarters secret message 2874 dated 7 July 1956, subject: (Secret) "Special SAC Requirements, B-52 and KC-135 Satellite Bases", again requested your headquarters to furnish comments on Inclosure 2 as indicated above.

(3) Your headquarters secret letter AFCEH-W dated 25 July 1956, subject: (U) "Special Requirements, Strategic Air Command, Satellite Bases", included a copy of above mentioned satellite requirements list. Items which were not approved by your headquarters were deleted by a red line. However, Item 12-183, Hangar, Alert was changed from 370,000 SF to 8 M and Item 14-184, Ready Personnel Shelter was changed from 4,500 SF to 8 M. This action was construed by this headquarters to indicate approval of both the alert hangars and personnel shelters.

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R/MS-PT

SUBJECT: (U) SAC Alert Facilities

b. Criteria and definitive design of alert facilities.

(1) This headquarters confidential letter dated 26 May 1956, subject: (Conf) "Proposed alert facility", furnished criteria for both alert hangars and personnel shelters.

(2) Your headquarters unclassified letter AFCEC-BA/T, dated 13 June 1956, subject: "Alert Facilities", indicated that criteria as submitted by 2b(1) above was being evaluated, that a concept drawing would be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review.

(3) Your headquarters unclassified letter AFCEC-BA/T dated 25 June 1956, subject: "Alert Facilities", transmitted a preliminary sketch on the alert facility for this headquarters review and comments and indicated that upon receipt of the comments, final drawings would be prepared by your headquarters. This headquarters first inforsement dated 15 July furnished the required comments.

c. Geographical requirement for alert hangars. This headquarters secret letter dated 7 May 1956, subject: (Secret) "FY-1958 Military Construction Program Alert Package", indicated that alert hangars for both bomber and tanker aircraft are required at XI bases located North of the 37th parallel, excluding California. Later study has indicated that this limit should be changed to the 39th parallel. (Secret)

3. Specific facility requirements for support items to the alert concept, as required by part 2 of your message AFCEC 54386, have not been forwarded since this headquarters considered both the alert hangars and personnel shelters to be approved items and the remaining required projects constitute support items to a special package. Additional justification for all the facilities which are envisioned at the present time, with the exception of personnel items, are listed below. These comments are prepared with the benefit of the results of the Winter tests.

a. Project 141-101, Hangar, Alert. This facility is required to protect alert aircraft, both bomber and tanker, from the adverse affects of inclement weather. The rapidly growing capability of the Soviet Union to wage intercontinental aerial warfare necessitates the placing of 1/3 of the SAC forces on a 15 minute alert at all times. This 15 minute limitation makes an alert hangar mandatory at bases subject to ice and snow conditions. This hangar should accommodate 1 B-52; 2 B-47s; 2 B-70s; 2 B-135s; or 2 B-58 aircraft. It will not be required at warm bases.

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~~SECRET~~ (S) 2nd Alert Facilities

b. Project 141-477, Shelter Crew. This facility, which will provide shelter for personnel assigned to alert aircraft, is required at all 2nd bomber bases and is further discussed in Enclosure Number 2 to this headquarters Programming Plan 9-56, subject: (Conf) Manning and Training of SAC Tactical Units in Support of the 1/3 Alert Concept, dated 30 July 1956. Each building will be of sufficient size to accommodate two crews (B-47, B-135, B-57 or B-58), or one crew (B-52, WE-110A). Each shelter will be sited adjacent to individual alert hangars at cold bases and adjacent to stabs on warm bases.

c. Communications facilities will include both telephone lines and closed circuit television. These items are required to furnish a means of alerting the crews, transmitting special instructions, ground training, and/or weather forecasting.

d. Project 116-945, Reflector Blast. This facility will be required for each bomber and jet tanker space regardless of the alert status; except, none will be required for the aircraft parked in maintenance docks and hangars.

e. Security Facilities.

(1) Project 113-32A, Apron, Alert Parking - This facility should be sited near the end of the runway, with direct connection to the runway and should provide a segregated area for alert bomber and tanker force isolated from all other aircraft. This is necessary to rigidly control access to these aircraft on a strict need basis. The area should be of sufficient size to permit safe parking of both bomber and tanker aircraft and should be so designed that one burning aircraft in any position would not block the remainder of the alert force from take off. With the critical nature of refueling in the EOP, tanker aircraft assume an unprecedented importance in that they may be called upon to refuel more than one bomber.

(2) 730-832, Scty, Control & Ident. - This 1,120 SF facility should be sited adjacent to the taxiway and should be the center of security operations and as such should contain an administrative area, alarm annunciation equipment, security alert force facilities, and access control features. The personnel and vehicle access gate for the alert area should be located immediately adjacent to the security control and identification facility which will serve as the gate house.

(3) 812-923, Flood Lights - Security lighting should be installed around the entire alert area, positioned so as to furnish lighting

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D/ENG-PP

SUBJECT: (U) SAG Alert Facilities

to the approaches to the alert area but leaving the alert area itself in comparative darkness. Such lighting offers opportunity for a more thorough surveillance of all avenues of approach to this sensitive area. The lights should be wired in battery groups in a similar manner to that as prescribed for certain ADS sites.

(4) 872-246, Fence, Electric - An electronic fence similar to the type presently used in certain ADS areas should be installed inside the chain link fence to detect all attempts at intrusion into the area. The vulnerability of nuclear weapons to sabotage is greatly increased when the weapon is taken from the well-secured igloo and placed aboard an aircraft fully loaded with fuel. The taxiway gap in the fence complex should be equipped with a photo-electrical device or personnel surveillance radar capable of detecting passage of objects through the gap.

(5) 872-247, Fence Security - The alert area should be enclosed within a chain link cyclone-type fence not less than seven feet high and equipped with a one foot barbed wire outward overhang. This type of fence has been specified by Headquarters USAF for protecting Category I elements. (AFM-205-4).

(6) Project 939-949, Passive Def. Revetment - A revetment or other protective structure should be provided for each alert aircraft. These revetments should be so designed that, in the event one aircraft explodes for any reason, the sloping sides of the revetment will deflect the force of the blast up and over the highest part of the aircraft, excluding the vertical stabilizer, parked in the adjacent parking areas. These revetments would also tend to shield the alert striking force from the hazard of off base small arms fire. The parking surface should be contoured or sump equipped to prevent spilled fuel from flowing to other alert aircraft.

f. 851-147, Road - This facility is required to provide access to the alert area for both fire fighting and maintenance equipment.

g. Electrical power projects.

(1) 821-220, Electric Distribution Line - as required.

(2) 811-143, Elec Emergency Power Plant - This facility is required to furnish emergency power for the electric fence, hangars, personnel shelters and aircraft starting equipment.

h. Utility items such as gas mains, water lines and sanitary sewer lines should be provided as required. ~~(Secret)~~

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~~SECRET~~ (U) ~~and~~ Alert Facilities

4. Additional deferment of design and authorization to program alert facilities is unacceptable to this headquarters, since existing intelligence indicates that the requirement for facilities to support the 2/3 - 15 minute alert concept within the FY 61 end position is mandatory and must be finalized, programmed and funded in the FY-59 Military Construction Program. Accordingly, design of the required alert hangars and personnel shelters cannot be deferred pending finalization of dimensional and operational data for follow-on bomber aircraft. ~~(Secret)~~

5. In order that preparation of the FY-59 Military Construction Program may be expedited, it is again requested that your headquarters take the following actions:

a. Authorize this headquarters to include facilities in the FY-59 Military Construction Program as required to support the alert concept.

b. Finalize and furnish this headquarters copies of definitive designs for both alert hangars and personnel shelters. ~~(Secret)~~

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

C. F. Dreyer  
Brig. Gen USAF  
Director of Instl. Engrs.

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Bsc ltr fr D/ENG-PP, Hq SAC, Subj: SAC Alert Facilities, dtd  
8 May 1957

AFCIR-W

1st Ind

11 Jun 1957

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base,  
Nebraska

1. This headquarters approved the SAC alert concept in principle only for implementation within resources available to your command. Exception to this policy has been made where additional apron pavement is required. The new pavement can be constructed in the alert configuration. There has been no specific approval for implementation of the alert concept through the Military Construction Program to date.

2. Until the results of the Hunter tests are submitted and evaluated, no final decision can be made as to what implementation of the SAC alert concept might be made in the FY 59 MCP. However, a package of \$25 million has been allocated against SAC alert facilities in the FY 59 Military Construction Program. It is anticipated that these facilities may be alert ready crew facilities.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

WILLIAM E. RENTZ  
Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force  
Deputy  
ACS/I

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PL 1086

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DPL

21 May 1957

SUBJECT: Alert Through Dispersal (U)

TO: Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The strategic estimate of alert requirements makes it imperative that the SAC alert be programmed at the earliest possible date. This Hq is pursuing a plan to establish alert where possible with existing facilities, and is programming alert facilities consistent with budget limitations. However, SAC efforts to date will be considerably short of required facilities to support a SAC 1/3 alert concept. ~~(S)~~

2. During the preliminary Commander's Conference at Wright-Patterson AFB on 8 October 1956, General LeMay agreed that civilian as well as military bases could be used in support of alert through dispersal. However, the use of civilian bases must not jeopardize programmed or future Air Base development under Air Council Decision 31/30 dtd 12 Jul 1954. The development of civilian bases for SAC use can be utilized beyond the interim period, pending military Air Base development, to further satisfy the objectives directed by the above Air Council decision. ~~(S)~~

3. Further study of bases for alert through dispersal dictates that surveys be conducted to realistically select bases currently under consideration. Specifics of this program will be forwarded to your Hq for documentation, compatible with results of base surveys. (U)

4. Request your approval to survey military and civilian bases which appear to fulfill SAC requirements. This Hq will coordinate survey activities with your Hq. (U)

5. This correspondence is classified SECRET LAW Par 30b (2)(b), AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

/s/L. E. LYLE  
Col. USAF  
Deputy D/Plans

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June 6 1957

Basic Ltr to Hqs USAF, subj: Alert Through Dispersal (Uncl) dtd 21 May 57

1st Ind

Dept. of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, Offutt AF Base, Nebraska

1. The concept of alert for SAC forces is recognized and has been approved in principle. The limiting factor in implementing this concept is, and has been, the shortage of military construction funds. ~~(Confidential)~~

2. Your proposal would attempt to achieve alert through dispersal to civilian and/or military bases. This concept goes beyond the objective of one (1) medium bomb wing or one (1) heavy bomb squadron per base as laid down by Air Force Council Decision 31/30 dated 13 July 1954. ~~(Secret)~~

3. The alert concept as presented to and approved by Headquarters USAF envisions that one-third (1/3) of the bomber force would be on continual alert at the location where the heavy squadron or medium wing is based. ~~(Secret)~~

4. By recommending further dispersal than now approved in order to obtain an alert force, an entire set of new problems are generated. Representative of these are the following: ~~(Secret)~~

a. Approval of appropriate Federal or State Agency prior to authority to survey civil bases.

b. Public opinion and decision or approval relative to placing atomic weapons on civil bases.

c. Additive construction, communications and manpower costs.

d. Acceptance by your command of joint military/civilian utilization.

5. In order that your "alert through dispersal" concept may be evaluated, the following information is required: ~~(Secret)~~

a. Detailed concept of operations in the use of these bases, and how this concept ties in with the scope of dispersal as set forth in Air Force Council Decision 31/30.

b. Estimated additive cost to implement this concept in MCP and O&M funds, and manpower authorization.

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Basic Ltr to Hqs USAF, subj: Alert Through Dispersal (U) dtd 21 May 57  
(1st Ind Contd)

c. Estimated cost comparison between "alert through dispersal", and alert, either classical or on the ramp, on existing or programmed bases.

d. Is this concept applicable for only the Zone of the Interior? It is noted that rotational medium bomb wings are deployed to overseas areas with all 45 aircraft on one (1) base.

e. Concept of prepositioning MRM on these bases.

f. A complete list of those bases selected for survey.

6. As indicated in basic letter, programmed or future Air Base development to support dispersal must receive priority over any other "alert through dispersal" concept. In this regard, it could not be anticipated that fund authorization could be obtained to begin implementation of your concept prior to the Fiscal Year 1960 Military Construction Program. ~~(Secret)~~

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/GEORGE R. BICKELL  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Deputy Director  
Directorate of Operations, DCS/O

~~SECRET~~